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STUDENT NOTE
IS THE FOOD MANUFACTURER AN INSURER OF THE
WHOLESOMENESS OF HIS PRODUCT?
The recent West Virginia cases of Webb v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Co.,1 Parr v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Charleston,2
and Blevins v. Raleigh Coca Cola Bottling Works3 adopted for this
state the generally-recognized doctrine that a manufacturer who
puts products designed for human consumption on the market in
original sealed packages owes a duty directly to the consumer to see
that such products are free from harmful defects and deleterious
substances which may cause injury.4  Our court in these cases
predicated liability on the theory of negligence of the manufacturer
in the preparation of its product. Plaintiff's case was made out
in each instance by aid of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.5 As
pointed out by Judge Kenna in his separate concurring opinion in
the Webb case, and confirmed by an examination of the authorities'
there is wide diversity of opinion as to the theories upon which such
liability is founded and manifest confusion in the practical appli-
cation of such theories in a given case.
This note proposes to adopt as its main thesis consideration
of the question of the degree of the manufacturer's responsibility
under the doctrine enunciated above; and the further question of
how that duty may best be given legal expression. This will neces-
sarily require brief analysis of the historical background, the ulti-
mate end sought by the courts, and the prevailing formulas in
terms of which courts state the result.
Soon after the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright7 ex-
ceptions began to be made to the rule there announced that a
manufacturer is not liable for injuries resulting from his negli-
gence in the preparation of his products to other than the person
or persons with whom he contracted. The first of these was in the
case of articles inherently or imminently dangerous to human life.8
Shortly, this relaxation of the rule was extended to include articles
12 S. E. (2d) 898 (W. Va. 1939).
2 3 S. E. (2d) 499 (W. Va. 1939).
3 3 S. E. (2d) 627 (W. Va. 1939).
4 Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. 688; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246
Ky. 65, 54 S. W. (2d) 612 (1932).
5 For a good discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as applied to
these cases see Note (1935) 23 KY. L. J. 534.
6 For a collection of the cases see Note (1937) 111 A. L. R. 1239.
7 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. R. 402 (1842).
8 Huset v. J. I. Case etc. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903).
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which, while not in their nature imminently dangerous, become so
if negligently prepared.9 Gradually this latter exception came to
embrace foods and beverages designed for human consumption and
put on the market in original sealed packages or bottles. 0
The fundamental basis of the doctrine undoubtedly arose out
of the policy of protecting the public health,"- and may be traced
back to the early date of 1266 in England. There the medieval
Statute of Pillory and Tumbrel and the Assize of Bread and Ale 2
ordained "that none shall sell corrupt victuals". It was also laid
down broadly by Blackstone "that in contracts for provisions it is
always implied that they be wholesome, and if they be not the
same remedy (damage for deceit) may be had." 1  The vast in-
crease in the sale of manufactured products which has taken place
within the last half century has motivated the courts to go the
limit in giving this same principle copious expression in our
cases.'
0
Despite this manifest tendency to favor the consumer there is
clear lack of unanimity in the formulas employed to reach that
end.'" However, two main theories0 emerge as a basis for adjudica-
tion of most claims: (1) negligence of the manufacturer in the prep-
aration of the product with recovery in tort, and (2) implied war-
ranty that the article is fit for human consumption with recovery
in contract.
Since the doctrine had its origin in the substantive law of
negligence, quite naturally most courts state the result in those
0 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 116 X. E. 1050 (1916).
20 Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 Atl. 314 (1908).
11 One of the earlier cases had this to say: "Among the most fundamental of
personal rights, without which man could not live in a state of society, is the
right of personal security, including 'the preservation of a man's health from
such practices as may prejudice or annoy it' .... To assert, therefore, that
one living in a state of society organized, as ours is, according to the principles
of the common law need not be careful that his acts do not endanger the life
or impair the health of his neighbor seems to offend against the funda-
mentals."I Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 Atl. 314, 317 (1908).
12 Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liabilty (1919) 5 IowA L.
BULL. 6. See also 1 WILISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 241, note 6.
'3 3 BL. Comm. 165.
14 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S. W. (2d) 445 (1936).
29 See Judge Kenna's opinion in Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
2 S. E. (2d) 898 (W. Va. 1939).
10 See Note (1937) 111 A. L. R. 1239. For an excellent treatment of the
two theories, citing cases, see Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 IQwa 775
176 N, W, 382 (1931).
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terms." Negligence in these cases, however, can be established
only by the aid of res ipsa loquitur or other evidentiary presump-
tions. Without going into the technical phases of such presump-
tions, suffice it to say that a majority of courts treat them as mak-
ing out a prima facie case for the plaintiff which the defendant
manufacturer may rebut by proof of care in the process of prepara-
tion.' In a minority of states the effect of these presumptions is
to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, thus casting on him
the burden of showing affirmatively that he was not negligent. 9
But even under the former view as it is applied in these cases, the
rule, in effect, is none the less unfavorable to the defendant manu-
facturer, because in any event the case goes to the jury. Where the
duty imposed is less than that of insurer, some degree of negligence
must be found. It is obvious that evidence as to what happened in
the particular event cannot be presented; instead, the finding must
revolve about proof of the general methods employed in the manu-
facturing processes. So courts consistently achieve the ultimate
end, imposition of an insurer's liability, on the principle that the
jury could find that the foreign substance was in the package or
bottle when issued by the manufacturer from the fact, if it be a
fact, that it was present when the plaintiff opened its original seal
for consumption.20
The whole difficulty is with producing evidence.2 1 The results
in these cases lead to but one ultimate conclusion - when the con-
sumer proves that he received a product prepared by the defendant
in original sealed packages, that therein was a harmful substance,
and that from the use of such product he suffered injury, then in
the language of the courts, he has made out a prima facie case, and
from a practical standpoint an unanswerable one. This seems
to be borne out by an observation of Judge Kenna in the Webb
case: "It seems that the effect of the court's opinion, based upon
what it is said the jury could regard as an insufficient system,
inferentially would require the jury to disregard the defendant's
proof in order that a recovery be justified."' 22 Under this hypoth-
17 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1931);
Norfolk Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Krausse, 162 Va. 107, 173 S. B. 497
(1934).
38 Note (1935) 23 KY. L. J. 534.
-Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S. W. (2d) 612
(1932).
20 Dr. Pepper Co. v. Brittain, 234 Ala. 548, 176 So. 286 (1937).
21 See Judge Kenna's opinion in Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
2 S. E. (2d) 898 (W. Va. 1939).
22 Id. at 902.
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esis, it would seem the defendant must show what, if other than his
negligence, caused the injury complained of.
Assuming that the manufacturer establishes by satisfactory
proof, as is undoubtedly true in most cases, that he used every
known precaution in the exercise of care, how are we consistently
to say that the defendant is negligent? Judge Hatcher in dis-
senting in the Blevins case on the ground that recovery predicated
on negligence was not justified where the manufacturer had made
an unrefuted showing of the exercise of care in its methods, in
effect, voices this same apprehension. In the Webb case, plaintiff
bit into some sort of worm embedded in chewing tobacco manu-
factured by the defendant and sold to her son by a local dealer,
with the result that stingers or stickers penetrated her mouth
causing injury. The defendant offered the testimony of its super-
intendent that reasonable precautions were taken to prevent a
foreign substance entering or remaining in all tobacco manu-
factured by it. In holding that a recovery was justified the court
made this significant statement: "But the fact remains that, not-
withstanding the care exercised by the manufacturer and the
possibility that the injury complained of might have resulted from
some development not traceable to its acts, a worm or moth did
get into the tobacco plug, and from this fact resulting injury was
sustained by the consumer." 23 There are, then, in these cases two
probative elements in conflict; evidence of care, and the presence
of a foreign substance in the product. The verdict, then, must
necessarily be founded in pure conjecture, 4 and how the jury will
decide is obvious.
Reluctant to state the ultimate end in terms of negligence,
in view of the clear inconsistency between theory and result, a
growing number of courts have substituted what is known as the
doctrine of implied warranty.25 This theory proceeds on the
assumption that the manufacturer, as an incident of his business,
impliedly warrants that his goods are fit for human consumption.2 6
It has merit in making the duty absolute on the manufacturer, and
being a less circuitous device. Practical difficulties in applying
the theory, however, have caused a majority of courts to reject it.27
23 Id. at 900.
24 Hoback v. Coea Cola Bottling Works, 98 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tenn. 1936).25Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Olio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928):
Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S. W.
(2d) 445 (1936).2G Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928).
27Note (1934) 4 BRooiLmY L. REv. 93.
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First it is to be noted that implied warranty, though having a tort
origin, has come to be primarily contractual in nature. 28  Conse-
quently, in the case of a remote vendee there is laeldng those re-
quired elements of contract which the buyer-seller relation con-
notes; noticeably, a lack of privity." The Uniform Sales Act be-
cause of ambiguity in its warranty sections has not aided much,
most courts treating it merely as declaratory of the preexisting
common law, 0 with the result that it has had rare, if any, applica-
tion on the point in question in the cases.3 1
Courts taking this minority view resort to novel legal fictions
to get around the privity requirement.3 2  Some explain that the
warranty runs with the article sold, much in the nature of a cove-
nant running with the land, and inures to the benefit of the con-
sumer;" others say there is a representation by the manufacturer
directly to the consumer through the medium of modern advertis-
ing methods,3 4 and still others assert that the consumer is a third
party beneficiary of the implied contract between the manufacturer
and his immediate vendor.3 A few decisions go so far as to dis-
regard privity altogether; one saying that if privity of contract is
essential, "such exists in the consciousness and understanding of
all right thinking persons;" 36 and another puts it on the ground
of "social justice".3 7  Though admittedly preferable to the negli-
gence approach, to create in this class of cases an exception to the
doctrine of privity is hardly justified if more direct formulas sug-
gest themselves.
The real question underlying all this is, have the courts ar-
rived today at the belief that the manufacturer of food products
should be held as an insurer? If that stage, in effect, has been
reached, a more direct approach to the problem of giving legal
28 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 195.
29 Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155 (1915).
See also 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 244a.
so Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Souree of Liability (1919) 5 IowA L.
BULL. 86, 104.
31 Note (1929) 63 A. L. R. 340. See Hoback v. Coca Cola Bottling Works,
98 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tenn. 1936).
32 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913). See
Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S. W.
(2d) 445 (1936) which asserts that by the weight of authority a suit of this
character cannot be based upon a breach of implied warranty.
33 Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
34 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
85Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. r. 557 (1928).
30 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
90 S. W. (2d) 445 (1936).
37 Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479 (1930).
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expression to such inner conviction is highly desirable. Despite a
growing trend in that direction, courts in general stop short of
that result, and prefer instead to warp established legalistic ex-
pressions almost beyond recognition." There are those that assert
that under the negligence theory a means is left open for the inno-
cent to escape." There is also a hesitancy growing out of the be-
lief that to go all the way might, conceivably, result in an increase
in spurious claims. But probably foremost in impeding an almost
inevitable result is the reluctance of courts to lay down arbitrary
standards of conduct on any individual or group.40
On the contrary, there is apparent a more than ordinary
policy bespeaking clarification of the law in this respect. The
tendency more and more to provide food products in original
sealed packages which precludes the consumer judging for himself
as to their fitness, the increasingly impersonal character of the
buyer-seller relation, and the present-day tendency for the local
merchant to lose his business autonomy, all lend almost unanswer-
able support to this hypothesis. There is actually no blame on
either side except such as results from social and economic factors;
but the potential forces of harm exhibited by improperly prepared
food products abide irrespective of blame. Social justice would
seem to require that the loss be imposed on the one better able to
spread it, for it is likely that in business practice provisions are al-
ready being made to negative any such loss by charging it to pro-
duction costs. 41 In view of the ease with which he may protect
himself, the expense and inconvenience of trials made long and
complicated by outmoded legal machinery, and the difficulty of
producing evidence, the manufacturer is not to be prejudiced
unduly by a new approach that definitely clinches responsibility.
In contrast, such a step is more than desirable in view of the doc-
trine in some states, including West Virginia, denying recovery by
the consumer against his immediate vendor in this type of case.4 2
After all, the true bases for, and the motivating forces behind
these decisions are not questions of negligence or of warranty, but
rather that the results are based primarily upon the exigencies
38 Liggett & 21yers Tobacco Co. v. Ranldn, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S. W. (2d) 612
(1932).
30 Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155 (1915).
40 See Harris, Liability Without Fault (1932) 6 TuLANB L. REV. 337.
41 Bogert & Fink, Business Practices Regarding Warranties in the Sale of
Foods (1930) 25 ILL. L. REv. 400.
42 Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S. E. 610 (1936);
Comment (1937) 43 W.- VA. L. Q. 84.
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of social justice as concerned with the relative positions of the
parties to the cases. It is submitted, therefore, that our courts
should extend to this class of cases the principle of liability with-
out fault, imposed in analogous situations in our law.43  An alter-
native may be found in legislation 44 which it is not within the
province of this note to discuss, but which invites the attention
of legislative bodies throughout the country.
D. R. K.
43 Marquet v. La Duke, 96 Mich. 596, 55 N. W. 1006 (1896).
44 An expression of the desirability of appropriate legislation is found In
Judge Kenna's opinion in the Webb case.
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